

グローバルな対テロ戦争が 国際平和活動に与えた影響

The Impact of the Global War on Terrorism upon International Peace Operations

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Abstract:

International peace operations began to grow and change at the time of the issuance of the Brahimi Report in 2000. Almost simultaneously, the global war on terror (GWOT) began and spread. Newly created international peace operations in the 21st century have been struggling to cope with the impact of the GWOT in the Sahel and the Horn of Africa in particular. Many adventurous attempts of new types of international peace operations have been introduced since then including “robust operations”, “partnership peace operations”, etc. With the bitter experiences of the GWOT, international peace operations are now experiencing severely disillusioned results and historically rapid downsizing.

(要旨)

国際平和活動は、2000年の『ブラヒミ報告書』公刊の頃から、拡大し、変化を遂げてきた。その過程と同時に進んだのが、「グローバルなテロとの戦争 (GWOT)」である。21世紀になってから新たに設立された国



国際平和活動は、特にサヘルやアフリカの角などの地域において、「GWOT」の影響を受けてきた。「大胆な作戦」、「パートナーシップ平和活動」などを含む新たな形態の国際平和活動のための様々な試みがなされてきた。「GWOT」の苦い経験をふまえて、国際平和活動は幻滅を経験する時期に入り、歴史的にも急激な規模縮小の時代に入っている。

Keywords: international peace operations, partnership peace operations, global war on terror

キーワード：国際平和活動、パートナーシップ平和活動、グローバルな対テロ戦争

1. Introduction

The Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) has been affecting many policy areas, which has not yet been comprehensively exhausted due to its enormous magnitude. The misperception is that the GWOT was only conducted by the United States in Afghanistan and Iraq in the form of counter-insurgency operation, and thus, it is over now after the US troops' withdrawal terminated its military operations in these countries. This leads to the misunderstanding of the geographical and political impacts of the GWOT. The radical Islamic groups are now geographically more widespread in Africa than in the Middle East. The termination of the US military operations did not end the violence of terrorist groups and counter-terrorism activities of many governments in the world. Its impacts are not contained in the narrow area of military security. They would include cultural matters represented by the serious level of mutual mistrust among many people in the world. The credibility of "the West" is morally and politically questioned in severe manners outside and even within the "West". It is still early to assess the overall impacts of the GWOT, as we are not sure of their end point. But it is imperative to continue to study the impacts for the future due to their magnitude and continuity.

This essay illustrates one of many policy areas that have been severely impacted

by the GWOT, international peace operations (hereafter IPOs).¹⁾ It should be quite logical to assume that the GWOT impacted the way international peace operations are planned and conducted, as IPOs are intended to improve security situations in volatile areas of the world. The link between the GWOT and IPOs is, however, quite often overlooked and even hidden in diplomatic and other public debates due to its political sensitivity. As a result, few studies have been introduced to explore the grave impacts of the GWOT upon IPSs. This essay tries to fill in the gap by warning that the impacts may continue to deteriorate security and political situations in the contemporary world.

This essay first delineates the way the GWOT and IPOs evolved in the 21st century by influencing each other without officially referring to each other. It geographically focuses upon Africa where many IPOs are deployed in contrast to the Middle East where a few IPOs are introduced. The very recent development of political events in West Africa such as the spread of coup d'état in Francophone countries in the region would draw special attention in particular. The chapter touches upon Europe too by contextualizing the significance of the Russo-Ukraine War in our age. In so doing, the essay discusses the impacts of the GWOT upon IPOs as regards the latter's doctrines and principles newly established in the 21st century. The concluding remarks of this essay would suggest that the changes in the GWOT coincide with the changes in IPOs and thus the perspective to examine both policy fields across national and international organizations would be highly needed.

2. Operational Need to respond to Attacks against Civilians

At the beginning of the 21st century, the GWOT and the IPOs, two categorically separate policy areas, began to advance in the new conceptual framework. The major Western states were the promoters of activities in both areas. Their renewed value setting was the conceptual foundation of the development of the activities.

¹⁾ By “international peace operations”, this chapter means various kinds of international activities, which categorically include peacemaking, peacekeeping, peacebuilding, aimed to achieve peace after armed conflict.

One significantly new advocated principle at the beginning of the 21st century was the “protection of civilians” (PoC). The “protection” discourse began to dominate and reform the conceptual framework of IPOs since the publication of the “Brahimi Report” in 2000. The GWOT reshaped the conceptual framework of international security after the shocking event of the 9-11 in 2001. The governments were required to protect civilians against not just traditional security threats from other states, but also untraditional non-state security threats including terrorist attacks. How governments can protect civilians domestically from foreign threats and internationally in foreign theaters became the imperative questions that changed the mind-set of policy-makers and the framework of policy formulation.

The GWOT substantially started at the beginning of the 21st century. This does not mean that counter-terrorism activities did not exist prior to 2001. But the 9.11 terrorist attack in the United States was such an epoch-making incident that counter-terrorism activities became active or even offensive responses to the threats outside of territories of sovereign states taking intervention actions after 2001. Likewise, while international peace operations had existed before 2001, the significant evolutions of doctrines and practices of IPOs started at the beginning of the 21st century. The threshold of the 2000 “Brahimi Report” made the new type of IPOs completely different from the old-fashioned traditional United Nations peacekeeping operations (UN PKOs).

It is true that many failures of the UN PKOs in the 1990s represented by the tragedies of the genocide in Rwanda and the massacres in Bosnia and Herzegovina among others led to the observations of the critical importance of the authority of international humanitarian law, which has the indispensable linkage with international criminal law. Due to the growing need to respond to atrocities against civilians, the two UN PKOs established in East Timor and Kosovo in 1999 after the military interventions by regional forces against perpetrators of serious human rights abuses were given the mandate to maintain overall domestic security.²⁾ In both cases international judicial interventions in the form of international war

²⁾ UN Document S/RES/1244 (1999), 10 June 1999 and S/RES/1272 (1999), 25 October 1999.

crimes tribunal / panel were provided.³⁾ The debate to renew IPOs in the direction of strengthened law enforcement functions was mainly led by European and North American states. This trend synchronized with the growing concerns about terrorist activities against civilians in the 1990s among European and North American states.

In the 2000 at the time of the so-called Millennium Summit in New York the UN issued the historic report to reform UN peace operations under the official title of the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, widely known as the “Brahimi Report” named after the name of the chairperson of the panel, Lakhdar Brahimi.⁴⁾ The Brahimi Report put the emphasis upon the concept of “the rule of law” in the context of the “doctrinal change” to reform UN PKOs in a more integrated direction. For instance, the Brahimi Report advocated the renewed understanding of the role of UN international police. Its official name was later changed from “Civilian Police” to “UN Police” to symbolize its functional change. The UN Police sometimes took the role of “executive police” together with the local police or provided capacity building for local law enforcement officers. The UN Police began to deploy “Formed Police Units (FPU)” as a result of the reform. In line with the emphasis on the rule of law as a guiding concept of the doctrinal shift, the judicial reform became one of the common agendas among new IPOs after the Brahimi Report.

Under this setting, the military component could not be kept away from the trend of integration. In the process of reforming UN PKOs, the military component was expected to be ready to be more “robust” in executing the mandate. The humiliation of UN PKOs in the 1990s was its inability to respond to humanitarian crisis due to the traditional understanding of peacekeeping as monitoring based upon rigid neutrality. Active use of military troops was one significant task to be achieved in the reform in the 21st century after the Brahimi Report. In order to maintain the

³⁾ In the case of Kosovo, the International Criminal Court for Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) exercised the jurisdiction over war crimes over in Kosovo. In the case of East Timor, the Special Panels for Serious Crimes was set up in 2000 as the so-called hybrid tribunal in the District Court in Dili with the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET).

⁴⁾ Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (Brahimi Report), UN Document, A/55/305-S/2000/809.

credibility of UN PKOs, “operations given a broad and explicit mandate for civilian protection must be given the specific resources needed to carry out that mandate.”⁵⁾

Since then, the “protection of civilians” has become such a widely-used important concept in UN PKOs. It represents the moral and operational pillar of a peacekeeping operations created in the 21st century. It has become normal that large UN peacekeeping missions deployed in the 21st century are equipped with the mandate of “protection of civilians”. When the UN Security Council gives the mandate of “protection of civilians”, it always grants the authority of enforcement action embodied in Chapter VII of the UN Charter. It became an established pattern in the 21st century that the mandate of protection of civilians always goes with the authority of Chapter VII. Not all mandates of UN PKOs are given the authority of Chapter VII. But the protection of civilians must always be regarded as a special provision that would sustain the credibility of UN PKOs and the moral ground of the entire international community.

The idea of “protection of civilians” was more rigorously advanced by the proponents of the doctrine of the “responsibility to protect (R2P)”. The report on R2P by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) issued in 2001 was an epoch-making document.⁶⁾ The doctrine to justify intervention by international actors to protect civilians in another sovereign state was intended to justify the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)’s military intervention in Kosovo against Serbia in 1999. NATO forces remained in Kosovo to provide a peacekeeping force to work together with a large UN PKO, United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). Later, the European Union (EU) took over the role of the military component in addition to the police force. There was a precedent of this pattern in Europe, as NATO and EU had provided military and police forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina where UN and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) took roles of some other civilian functions. “R2P” became a half-official UN concept with the backing

⁵⁾ Brahimi Report, p. x.

⁶⁾ International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), *Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty* (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001).

of the major Western countries. The concept was mentioned the 2005 World Summit Outcome document.⁷⁾ The UN Security Council referred to the concept when it passed the resolution to authorize NATO's intervention in Libya in 2011.⁸⁾

The developments of the GWOT and IPOs are two separate phenomena. This essay does not necessarily overemphasize the inseparability of the two spheres of international security activities. Nevertheless, they developed in the same period of time with the initiatives of the same international state actors. The “protection of civilians” was the internationally shared idea that crossed the operational boundary of the GWOT and IPOs. In the first two decades in the 21st century, the two spheres of international security activities mutually influenced each other. As the GWOT mainly consists of combat operations and UN PKOs are not engaged with combat operations, the two spheres of international security activities are supposed to have no overlap. But they shared the same guiding idea and were expected to be mutually contributory in the overall international security architecture. IPOs' operational doctrines like disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) and security sector reform (SSR) were more or less introduced in Afghanistan and Iraq after the US invasions to oust the previous regimes. The GWOT influenced the IPOs as regards de facto introduction of anti-terrorist activities where the terrorist organizations were prevalent in the theatres of IPOs.

3. Liberal Values as a Framework of International Security Operations

The discourse of protection of civilians is powerful because of the moral imperative of saving human lives. It also resonates with the constitutional doctrine of major liberal states. The idea that protecting each individual is the most paramount responsibility of a government in a state coincides with the traditional doctrine of constitutionalism or classic liberalism. The idea of R2P expanded the range of

⁷⁾ 2005 World Summit Outcome, UN Document A/RES/60/1, 24 October 2005.

⁸⁾ UN Document, S/RES/1970 (2011), 26 February 2011 and S/RES/1973 (2011), 17 March 2011. See Roland Paris, “The ‘Responsibility to Protect’ and the Structural Problems of Preventive Humanitarian Intervention,” *International Peacekeeping*, vol. 21, no. 5, pp. 569-603.

application of constitutionalism or classic liberalism in the international scene. According to the doctrine of constitutionalism, the government is the creation of a social contract among members of society to protect themselves. Individuals in the state of nature create a government because they are better able to protect themselves with the government than without it. The classical thinkers of liberalism like Thomas Hobbes and John Locke advocated the need to create society and government for the goal of protecting fundamental individual rights.⁹⁾ Thus, the government has the sacred responsibility to protect members of society. If the government fails to do so due to unwillingness or inability, members of society do not have to regard the government as the exerciser of constitutionally admitted sovereign power. In such a case they are justified to resort to the right of resistance or revolution. They can even invite foreign intervention to oust constitutionally wrong power-holders. This theory of constitutionalism or classic liberalism is the backbone of R2P at the time of introduction of the protection discourse in IPOs. If the GWOT indicates that members of society ought to be protected with the military intervention to oust foreign despots or terrorists who might attack civilians in other countries, the IPOs ought to be ready to work together with the functions of the GWOT by sharing the same value framework.

This logic was not refutable, as long as the IPOs advocate the protection discourse. But it is apparently awkward if this means that IPOs should completely be absorbed by the GWOT, as the former is designed for peace and the latter is about war. If the terrorists are threats to peace as violators of lives of civilians, it might be possible to see the shared goal of peace and protection of civilians. But how much are they merged? There must be a distinction between peace and war even if they share the same goal and values. But the distinction would have to be so subtle that nobody can indicate it clearly.

In a way, this is a fundamental dilemma in the post-Cold War world where the narrative of the “End of History” as the victory of liberal democracy raised many moral and political questions. The GWOT was claimed to be conducted for the

⁹⁾ See, for instance, Hideaki Shinoda, *Re-examining Sovereignty: From Classical Theory to the Global Age* (London: Macmillan, 2001).

sake of the protection of the Free World. UN PKOs have a de fact tendency to rely upon the value system of liberalism, as shown in the debate about the “liberal peacebuilding theory”.¹⁰⁾ If liberalism is the absolute truth and the universal principle of human society, then, the convergence of the GWOT and IPOs would be obvious. They are the same efforts to achieve the same goal with the same implementers. If the Security Council or even all the UN member states consist of the same liberal states which are conducting the GWOT, then, the IPOs would be really absorbed by the GWOT. If that is not the case, but still the liberal states are dominant, it remains critical to ask how to draw the line of distinction between the GWOT and IPOs. These fundamental questions are highly complex and serious in the first two decades of the 21st century. After the US withdrawal from the theaters of the GWOT represented by its disastrous complete withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021, the fundamental questions remained even more complex and serious in a more uncertain manner.

4. New Principles of IPOs

In 2008 the UN issued the “United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines” or the so-called “Capstone Doctrine”. This widely shared document clarified how the UN PKOs changed at the beginning of the 21st century. According to the Capstone Doctrine, for instance, the UN PKOs relies upon the three principles; Consent of the parties; Impartiality; Non-use of force except in self-defence and defence of the mandate.¹¹⁾ All these correspond to the three principles of UN PKOs enshrined during the Cold War, but with some important modifications.

The traditional rigid understanding of “consent of the parties” meant the consent of all the conflict parties. Now, the Capstone Doctrine indicates that “The fact that the main parties have given their consent to the deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping operation does not necessarily imply or guarantee that there will also

¹⁰⁾ See Roland Paris, *At War's End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

¹¹⁾ United Nations, “United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines”, 2008, pp. 31-35.

be consent at the local level, particularly if the main parties are internally divided or have weak command and control systems. Universality of consent becomes even less probable in volatile settings, characterized by the presence of armed groups not under the control of any of the parties, or by the presence of other spoilers.” In the 21st century, the Security Council designates many organizations as terrorist groups under its sanctions regime. If UN PKOs need to get consent from these groups, it would either violate the Security Council sanctions regime by negotiating with terrorist groups or abandon the possibility of deployment by giving the terrorist group a de facto veto power. In the new setting, there is an indication that actors like the central government should be an indispensable main party to the conflict, but terrorist organizations designated as such by the government or even the Security Council should not be main parties.

“Impartiality” is a principle distinguished from neutrality. The traditional UN PKOs rigidly stuck to the principle of neutrality and always sought to identify its position between conflict parties in equal distance. The impartiality principle is, instead, the attitude of fairness to all the conflict parties from the perspective of principles. Neutrality is about positioning, and impartiality is about principles. If international humanitarian law compels UN peacekeepers to regard a certain conflict party as a war criminal, they would not have to treat them equally with other conflict parties. If one conflict party is the violator of a peace agreement, while others are not, UN should not pretend that all the conflict parties are equal in the eyes of the peace process. Terrorists are civilian attackers and thus instantly identifiable war criminals. The principle of impartiality requires peacekeepers to be more principled and treat terrorists as such.

The principle of the “non-use of force except in self-defence and defence of the mandate” drastically changed the operational framework of PKOs. Traditionally, the principle of non-use of force was restricted by the notion of “self-defence”. Use of force is permissible in the case of self-defence of peacekeepers; namely, otherwise, it is not permissible. However, if use of force is permissible as long as peacekeepers seek to execute the mandates given to them, this would mean that there is no restriction of use of force as long as they handle their jobs. The fact is that the UN Security Council does not grant such comprehensive executive power

to peacekeepers on the ground. But the Security Council can now highly flexibly decide on the way peacekeepers resort to use of force. The established pattern is that when the Security Council includes the mandate of the protection of civilians, then, it always grants the authority to resort to use of force under UN Charter Chapter VII to peacekeepers. This means that when the Security Council expects UN PKOs to be ready to function in volatile areas where terrorist organizations are active, it can easily mandate peacekeepers to act “robustly” by resorting to use of force.

In this way, IPOs developed the operational doctrines that enable them to function “robustly” in a theater where even the GWOT operation was simultaneously conducted. UN PKOs were not deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq where major combat operations were conducted by the forces of the US and its allies. But IPOs were expected to take more active or “robust” roles in the theatres of the GWOT in Africa where US involvements were significantly limited. This development of “robust” IPOs in Africa changed or advanced the nature of the relationship between the GWOT and IPOs in the second decade of the 21st century.

5. Partnership IPOs and the convergence with the GWOT

While the GWOT faced obstacles in Afghanistan and Iraq, ambitious IPOs were deployed in conflict-prone areas in Africa. The large “multidimensional” missions were more or less equipped with counter-insurgency functions under the guiding principle of the protection of civilians. Both Al-Qaida and Islamic State extended the linkage to Africa. Many terrorist organizations emerged in Africa in the 21st century with the pledges of loyalty to either Al-Qaida or IS leadership. It goes beyond the scope of this chapter to analyze the spread of such terrorist organizations in Africa in detail. Suffice it to say that IPOs can no longer ignore the fact that radical armed groups, with or without linkages with either Al-Qaida or IS, are the major sources of their operational difficulties.

The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) is a typical example of the de facto convergence of the anti-

terrorist combat operation and UN PKOs.¹²⁾ MINUSMA has been constantly faced with security threats in the North in face of radical Islamicists activities since its establishment. While counter-terrorist military operations were mainly conducted by the French intervention force and G5 Sahel of neighboring countries, MINUSMA could not be completely away from the circumstance on the ground. UN Security Council did not specifically give the Chapter VII mandate for “neutralization” of terrorist organizations to MINUSMA.¹³⁾ So, officially speaking, MINUSMA was not engaged with military combat operations against radical Islamicists. But the fact is that MINUSMA was expected to pursue state-building to prevent disruption of the authority of the central government including its security components and deploy peacekeeping troops for the protection of civilians. The de fact division of labour existed between MINUSMA and intervention forces with the expectation that they should work together coherently.

The Improving Security of United Nations Peacekeepers: We need to change the way we are doing business, or the so-called “Cruz Report”, published in 2017, warned against the increasing number of casualties of UN PKO personnel especially as a result of hostile attacks.¹⁴⁾ MINUSMA is the deadliest UN PKO recording 91 casualties in five years between 2013-2017, while the other large UN PKOs, United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), African Union - United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic (MONUSCO), and United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), recorded dozens of casualties in the same period. The Cruz Report proposed some

¹²⁾ See Louise Wiuff Moe, “The Dark Side of Institutional Collaboration: How Peacekeeping-Counterterrorism Convergences Weaken the Protection of Civilians in Mali”, *International Peacekeeping*, vol. 28, no. 1, 2021.

¹³⁾ See, for instance, International Crisis Group, “Finding the Right Role for the G5 Sahel Joint Force,” 12 December 2017 < <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/burkina-faso/258-force-du-g5-sahel-trouver-sa-place-dans-lembouteillage-securitaire>>.

¹⁴⁾ Carlos Alberto dos Santos Cruz, William R. Phillips, and Salvatore Cusimano, “The Improving Security of United Nations Peacekeepers: We need to change the way we are doing business (Cruz Report)”, December 2017. <https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/improving_security_of_united_nations_peacekeepers_report.pdf>

practical measures to improve the deadly circumstance. Later, the UN officials in the Department of Peace Operations (DPO) argued that there were certain improvements in some years after 2017, but even they could not say that signs of dramatic change have appeared. As of 30 June 2023 at the time of the bitter decision by the UN Security Council to close MINUSMA by the end of the year, the mission recorded 309 casualties.¹⁵⁾

It is true that UN PKOs are more or less hesitant to be involved in the situation where their activities are blended with the GWOT oriented combat operations due to the comparatively lower level of political will among member states. Accordingly, the trend of regional organizations or ad-hoc coalitions of neighboring states taking the role of providing combat-operation IPOs became significantly obvious. The pattern includes G5-Sahel in Mali as well as Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) composed of the troops of Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Benin in the area of Lake Chad Basin (LCB) against Boko Haram.¹⁶⁾ The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), mainly led by the Nigerian army, has experiences of deploying IPOs in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Cote d'Ivoire. While ECOWAS-led IPOs were not particularly labelled as counter-terrorist activities, it paved the way for the age of IPOs greatly conducted by regional organizations. The Southern African Development Community (SADC) provided counter-terrorist forces in the northern part of Mozambique after its military intervention in the eastern part of DRC, while the Rwandan contingent made more significant military intervention to neutralize the terrorist in Cabo Delgado.

The most important and deadly case is the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), now AU Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), against Al-Shabab. Even though the exact number has not been officially publicized, but it is widely believed that AMISOM/ATMIS has suffered thousands of casualties in the history of AMISOM/ATMIS since 2007. They are the peace support missions of the AU with the authorization of UN Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the UN

¹⁵⁾ UN Website, "United Nations Peacekeeping" "FATALITIES", < <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/fatalities>>.

¹⁶⁾ Cedric de Coning, L. Gelot, J. Karlsrud (eds.), *The Future of African Peace Operations: From the Janjaweed to Boko Haram* (Zed Books, 2016).

Charter.¹⁷⁾ Prior to the establishment of AMISOM in 2007, the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) deployed its Peace Support Mission to Somalia, which was called the IGAD Peace Support Mission in Somalia (IGASOM) for the purposes of protection and training. When AMISOM was established, there was the expectation that the AU mission after the IGAD mission was still a transition to a large UN PKO. But the UN Security Council members were reluctant to take over the role of peace mission in Somalia due to its nightmare memory in Somalia in the 1990s. It preferred to continue to authorize the AU mission in Somalia, while UN provides political and logistical support missions called United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) and United Nations Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS). This pattern did not change even after AMISOM was transformed into ATMIS in April 2022 with more strong emphasis upon the transition of responsibility of security operations to the authorities of the Federal Government of Somalia.

The trend of “partnership peacekeeping” is outstanding in the 21st century.¹⁸⁾ The concept of “partnership” means the mode of collaboration between UN and (sub-) regional organizations in IPOs. Given the constant pattern of “partnership” which gives non-UN entities like NATO, AU, ECOWAS, SADC or ad-hoc coalitions the role of combat operations and UN missions the role of non-combat operations, it is apparent that the “partnership” trend illuminates the reality of the convergence of the GWOT and IPOs. In the first place, UN provided political missions to Afghanistan and Iraq, United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA)

¹⁷⁾ UN Document, S/RES/1744 (2007), 20 February 2007. See also Paul D. Williams, *Fighting for Peace in Somalia: A History and Analysis of the African Union Mission (AMISOM), 2007 – 2017* (Oxford University Press, 2018).

¹⁸⁾ “Partnership” is one of the concepts significantly emphasized by the UN senior leaders. See, for instance, United Nations, “High-level Independent Panel on UN Peace Operations, Report of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations on uniting our strengths for peace: politics, partnership and people (HIPPO Report)”, UN Document A/70/95–S/2015/446, 17 June 2015.

Hideaki Shinoda, “The Possibility of Japan’s Contributions to International Peacebuilding in the Age of Partnership Peace Operations”, A K M Abdur Rahman (ed.), *Bangladesh in International Peacebuilding: Discourses from Japan and Beyond* (Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies, 2019), pp. 135-150.

and United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), during the time of the intensive combat operations of the forces of US and its allies. So, de fact partnership structures were formed in the main theatres of the GWOT between US and UN. It should be added that the US still now continue to provide air support to bomb Al-Shabab functions in Somalia. The drone US base in Niger covered the wide area of West Africa for the purposes of counter-terrorist intelligence activities. It should be added that in such areas like Somalia and West Africa, the EU provides “capacity-building” missions in many parts in Africa to strengthen security sector capacities of government in Africa by widening the sphere of the “partnership”.¹⁹⁾

The “partnership” style of multiple IPOs in the same area would have to be understood in the context of the convergence of the GWOT and IPOs in the larger picture of international security operations. It can be said that the need to broaden and strengthen counter-terrorist activities has facilitated the trend of “partnership” international peace operations. The GWOT does not absorb IPOs, while they influence each other and in fact collaborate without formal institutional settings.

The recent wave of coup-d'état in West African countries, Mali, Burkina Fasso, and Niger can be described as a grave indication of the effects of the phenomenon of the de facto convergence of the GWOT and IPOs. The various attempts of “partnership” peace operations have not yet produced tangible positive results in such vulnerable countries. People who are suffering from the spread of terrorist activities are increasingly frustrated by the inability of governments and international partners. This means that the de facto convergence of the GWOT and IPOs, in the Sahel in particular, has not been producing tangible results. Given the shadow of the Russian Wagner in such countries in the Sahel as well as other countries in Africa too, the future of the existing pattern of West-led partnership IPOs is uncertain. But at the same time there is no prospect that the international

¹⁹⁾ EUCAP (The European Union Capacity Building Mission) Somalia, EUCAP Sahel Niger, EUCAP Sahel Mali, EUNAVFOR Somalia (EU Naval Force Somalia Military Operation Atlanta), EUMPM Niger (EU Military Partnership Mission in Niger), EU RACC Sahel (EU Regional Advisory and Coordination Cell for the Sahel), EUTM Somalia (EU Training Mission in Somalia - Military Mission), EUTM Mali (EU Training Mission in Mali - Military Mission).

community can afford to abandon all these efforts without knowing the consequence of such a risky decision. The dilemma and the search for better partnerships will continue.

6. Concluding Remarks

This chapter has argued that there is a phenomenon of the de facto convergence of the GWOT and IPOs in the 21st century in the wider theater of the two areas of international security activities. The trend of “partnership” international peace operations is one significant indication of such a phenomenon. Whether the trend grows to produce tangible positive results remains to be seen. But it is still certain that even after the complete withdrawal of US and NATO troops from Afghanistan in 2021, the various different forms of the GWOT would have to continue and IPOs remain highly relevant to the course of the ongoing GWOT.